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clear, unequivocient under the statutory requirement as being
20
effective.
and
valid
and
cable, unambiguous,
V.

FIRE COVERAGE

Cases of note in the fire insurance field included a review by
the appellate courts of the proper penalty which can be assessed
on the non-payment of claims on a fire contract (12%, not
25%) ;21 and a determination that an agreed adjustment after
a fire loss becomes a new contract and its enforcement therefore
22
not subject to any policy restriction.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Wex S. Malone*
Although the Louisiana appellate courts handed down more
than a hundred decisions on workmen's compensation during
the past term, most of these either were resolutions of factual
disputes or involved only reiterations of familiar rules and principles. This reviewer was unable to locate more than a dozen
decisions whose novelty or contribution to the compensation law
of Louisiana justifies any extended comment.
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

It is a fundamental observation in workmen's compensation
law that an employee is not entitled to compensation unless his
work was in the course of his employer's hazardous trade, business, or occupation.' Somewhat similarly, an employee of a
contractor cannot successfully claim compensation from his employer's principal under R.S. 23:1061 unless the employer-contractor was executing work which was a part of the principal's
trade, business, or occupation.2 Thus the relationship between
20. Alexander v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 148 So. 2d 898 (La.

App. 1st Cir. 1962).
21. Welch v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 145 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962).
22. McCarter v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 147 So. 2d 104
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICE
§ 102 (1951).
2. Id.

§ 125.
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the nature of the work being done and the business being served
may be a matter of importance both in the suit by an employee
against his own employer and the suit by a contractor's employee against the principal under R.S. 23:1061.
But although the inquiry is similar in the two types of suits,
as suggested above, it is by no means identical in both instances.
For example, if the operator of an established hazardous business were to direct his own employee to make repairs or improvements on the employer's business premises, he would be
responsible for an accident that befell the employee while so
doing.3 If, however, the same business operator were to undertake the repair or improvement of his premises through the
agency of an independent contractor, an injured employee of
the contractor would probably be denied recovery against the
principal under R.S. 23:1061 on the ground that the contracted
work was not part of the business of the principal for the purposes of that section. 4 The test in a suit of this nature is to
inquire whether work of the kind in question is customarily
done through the agency of contractors. 5 Repair work on business premises is customarily performed through the medium of
a contract.,
This difference of approach- dependent upon whether the
suit is by a contractor's employe or by a direct employee of the
principal - poses a difficult question when a claim is asserted
by an injured contractor. In Louisiana (unlike most jurisdictions) the contractor who spends a substantial part of his work
time in manual labor is entitled to compensation just as though
he were an employee. 7 In the event of such a claim by a working contractor, how should the relationship between the contractor's work and the business of the principal be tested? If
the contractor is to be regarded as strictly analogous to the
direct employee, the contractor repairing or improving his principal's business premises will be entitled to compensation (even
though the contractor's own employee who was injured while
doing the same work would be denied recovery against the same
principal in a suit based on R.S. 23:1061).
3. Speed v. Page, 222 La. 529, 62 So. 2d 824 (1952).
4. Horrell v. Gulf & Valley Oil Co., 131 So. 709 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930).
5. See discussion in MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
& PRACTICE § 125 (1951).
6. Ibid.
7. LA. R.S. 23:1021(6) (1950).
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The problem outlined above was considered at length by the
court of appeal in Sam v. Deville Gin Co. 8 The opinion concluded that the contractor entitled to compensation under R.S.
23:1021(6) should be treated in this respect just as though he
were a direct employee and that the liberal test that controls
the employee's suit should be made applicable in the suit by the
working contractor.
At first glance it may appear difficult to approve an approach that would accord a recovery to the contractor when it
would be denied to the contractor's own employee against the
same principal for an identical accident. On further reflection,
however, the injustice disappears. We need only reflect upon
the purpose of R.S. 23:1061, which requires that the work done
by the contractor must be part of the business of the principal
before the contractor's employee is entitled to compensation from
the latter. Ordinarily a principal is not and should not be subjected to the compensation claims of his contractor's employees.
The compensation burden in such instances properly rests upon
the contractor himself. It is only when the principal seeks to
avoid his compensation obligation by farming out part of his
own normal operations to a contractor that an evil arises requiring exceptional treatment.9 Otherwise, the compensation
obligation should rest on the contractor alone. If, then, repair
work on business premises is customarily done by specialized
contractors, there is no sound reason why the principal should
be directly responsible to the contractor's workers. He has in
no way sought to avoid his normal compensation responsibility
through resort to the use of a contractor as intermediary.
On the other hand, the policy that underlies R.S. 23:1021(6)
(granting the contractor doing manual work the same rights
as the direct employee) is entirely different. This section was
added by amendment in 1948 because the former distinction
between contractor and employee had become so tenuous and
so difficult to administer that the cases were in a state of almost
hopeless confusion, and many injustices were apparent. 10 The
new provision was added in order to relieve the courts of this
difficulty by requiring that all manual workers be treated the
same, whether they were regarded technically as contractors or
8. 143 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
9. See discussion in MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW &
PRACTICE §§ 121, 127 (1951).
10. See id. §§ 73-79, inclusive.
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employees. The court, by entitling the contractor to the more
liberal approach on this matter, does not in any way detract
from any entitlements formerly enjoyed by the contractor's
employee, who still retains the right to proceed against his own
employer, the contractor.
ACCIDENTS ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT

The Louisiana courts were among the first in the country to
commit themselves to the so-called positional risk test in determining when an accident arises out of the claimant's employment. In the early decision, Kern v. Southport Mill," the Supreme Court announced that "an accident arises out of the
employment if the employee was engaged about his employer's
business at the time of the accident and the necessities of the
employer's business required that he be at the place of the
accident at the time the accident occurred.' 1 2 Although the positional risk test, announced above, has come into general usage
throughout the United States, it has usually been rejected in
situations where the risk that brought on the accident must be
attributed to the private affairs of the worker. It is not clear
that the Louisiana courts would subscribe to this limitation. In
Williams v. United States Cas. Co.,' 3 deceased, a bar maid, was
murdered by her estranged lover who sought her out at defendant's place of business. She was shot while actively attending
to her duties. The court used language suggesting that the positional risk test announced in the Kern decision is appropriate
even to the case of a personally motivated assault. However,
the opinion observed further that the duties of deceased required
that she leave a relatively protected place behind the bar and
pass near her assailant in order to answer the telephone at the
time she was shot. Hence the nature of her work required an
exposure to the bullet of her assailant.
PHYSICAL HARM RESULTING FROM EMOTIONAL EXCITEMENT
AS ACCIDENT

No problem in recent years has given courts and commissions throughout America more difficulty than the one presented
where an employee experiences an emotional shock or strain
in the course of his employment which brings about a physical
11. 174 La. 432, 141 So. 19 (1932).
12. Id., 174 La. 432, 438, 141 So. 19, 21 (1932).
13. 145 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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collapse, such as heart attack or cerebral hemorrhage. The
courts are properly hesitant when faced with this type of situation, and frequent denials of recovery can be expected. It is of
great importance, however, to understand the considerations
of policy and common sense that underlie the reluctance to
award compensation in these cases, because seldom are the true
reasons for doubt brought to the surface in the opinions. Instead,
courts tend all too frequently to explain their denials of compensation through observations on the nature of the term "accident" or "injury." This has often resulted in awkward restrictive definitions which have returned to haunt the decisions
thereafter.
The chief practical difficulty encountered in controversies
of this kind can be attributed to the fact that proof of causal
relation is likely to be extremely difficult whenever the only
means of associating the nature of the job with the injury is
the presence of some emotional excitement. In such cases even
the expert evidence on medical etiology is likely to be in sharp
dispute, for little is known concerning the effect of emotional
strain upon the various bodily functions. The elementary body
mechanics involved must remain in serious doubt. But even if
the trier can be satisfied at this point, there remains an even
more difficult question concerning the causal part, if any, played
by the conditions of employment in bringing on the emotional
tension that allegedly produced the damage. We human beings
are continually beset by emotional anxiety arising from every
quarter of our lives. Tensions brought on by domestic or private affairs, the scars of earlier maladjustments, together with
concern over the general vicissitudes of life are all operating
forces potentially contributing to our emotional distress. Furthermore, we vary greatly from each other with respect to our
tolerance of emotional tension. What might be roughly called
"job worry" may be only an inconsequential drop in the bucket,
and this may be true even when it is conceded that some job
event was the precipitating factor of collapse- the straw that
broke the camel's back.
Louisiana courts are accustomed to awarding compensation
in cases where physical strain or exertion brings about a general
systemic collapse. 14 Here the judge is competent to appreciate
14. See

MALONE,

§§214, 256 (1951).
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the body mechanics involved, and he will encounter comparatively little difficulty in relating the physical exertion to the
nature of the job or the conditions under which the employee
labored.' 5 In physical stress cases of this kind the trier can
often satisfy himself that the conditions of work played a sufficiently important part in bringing about the harm to justify
the award.
It is noteworthy that it is at this very point that the judge
finds himself frustrated in the "emotional strain" cases. Although the familiar notion that "the employer takes the employee as he finds him" furnishes a satisfactory approach in
cases involving impact or physical strain, 16 yet it is questionable
whether the same rule is appropriate without qualification in
situations involving purely emotional stress. A basic policy question is involved: should the worker who is already loaded down
with worries and conflicts arising from his private life be entitled to workmen's compensation whenever it can be shown
that some emotional experience on the job was superadded to
his troubles and thus led to collapse? Sound judgment may well
dictate that in these cases compensation should be denied unless
the trier is satisfied that the nature of the job or the conditions
of work played a dominant role in bringing about the nervous
tension that caused collapse. This writer knows no sound reason
why this approach could not be substituted in these situations
in place of the "precipitating factor" idea that is characteristic
of impact injury and physical strain cases. In final analysis the
problem faced by the courts in the emotional strain cases is very
closely akin to the familiar arise-out-of-employment issue. The
inquiry can be expressed thus: under what circumstances is the
risk of physical harm brought about by emotional distress to
be regarded as a risk that arises out of the employment?17 The
15. In a few jurisdictions compensation may be denied for heart attack or
cerebral hemorrhage caused by physical exertion unless the exertion can be characterized as "unusual." This position can be productive of great confusion, and
has been generally repudiated in the later decisions. See the excellent discussion
in 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 38.60-38.70 (1952). Louisiana courts
have wisely avoided this limitation. See MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICE § 214 (1951).
16. See MALONE,
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§232 (1951).
17. Professor Larson has expressed a similar view: "[The] practical considera-

tion is the fear that the heart cases and related types of injury and death will
get out of control unless some kind of arbitrary boundaries are set, and will
become compensable whenever they take place within the time and space limits

of employment. Most states have chosen to press the 'accident' concept into service
as one kind of arbitrary boundary, but, with a few exceptions, one gets the dis-
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advantage of the arise-out-of approach in these cases is that it
affords the flexibility needed in order to pass an intelligent
individualized judgment. The court should not be in a position
where it feels compelled to deny recovery arbitrarily merely
because the harm was inspired by emotional, rather than
physical, stress. At the same time the judge should not be
obliged to make an award whenever the evidence suggests that
the employment was a precipitating factor that played "some"
causal part in the eventual physical collapse. Recovery can be
appropriately restricted to those situations where some job
event or job condition played a substantial and obvious role
in the tragedy. It would be entirely appropriate to observe that
in the absence of a satisfactory showing in this respect, the
accident cannot be regarded as one that arose out of the employment.
Recently, in Danziger v. Employers Mut. Liab. Co.1 8 the Louisiana Supreme Court denied compensation in a situation involving death from cerebral hemorrhage induced by emotional
strain. However, in doing so it adopted a restrictive interpretation of the terms "accident" and "injury" which is likely to be
a source of considerable difficulty in future decisions. Under
the special facts of the Danziger case a denial of compensation
may have been entirely appropriate. Danziger was the general
manager and one of three directors of a concern engaged in the
manufacture of textile bags. The other two directors (and the
chief stockholders) were husband and wife. Both had retired
from the active management of the business because of ill health
of the husband, and they resided outside the state. Danziger
was awakened by phone in the middle of the night and was told
of the unexpected death of the wife. His distress over this news
was aggravated by frustration in his efforts to make arrangements for transportation to the place where his business associate had died. He suffered a disabling cerebral hemorrhage
while engaged in a telephone conversation concerning the incident.
Since the emotional distress involved in Danziger's case was
in the nature of grief, worry, frustration, and general concern,
tinct impression that what is behind it all is not so much an insistence on accidental quality for its own sake as the provision of an added assurance that compensation will not be awarded for deaths not really caused in any substantial
degree by the employment." 1 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATIOM LAW § 38.81
(1952).
18. 156 So. 2d 468 (La. 1963).
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the court could have disposed of the compensation claim simply
and effectively by announcing that the risk of bodily harm
through general concern and distress under such circumstances
cannot appropriately be regarded as one that arises out of the
employment and that it falls outside the protective purpose of
the compensation statute. 19
The writer suggests that the difficulty with the Danziger
decision lies in the court's insistence that Danziger did not
suffer an "injury" by "accident" within the meaning of the
statute, because there was no showing at the time of "objective
symptoms of an injury ' 2 and, further, the term "injury" im' 21
plies "violence to the physical structure of the body.
The court's reference to an absence of objective symptoms
is difficult to appreciate. It would seem that an employee who,
during the course of a business conversation, suddenly collapses
with paralysis presents a rather convincing picture of "objective
symptoms" of injury. No previous Louisiana decision has been
found that predicates a denial of compensation solely upon this
qualification of the term, accident.2 2 The only conceivable pur19. However, it is noteworthy that in the more recent decisions from other
jurisdictions the courts are allowing compensation for physical harm caused
solely by job tension and worry: Firemen's Fund Indemnity Co. v. I. A. C., 241
P.2d 299, aff'd 39 Cal.2d 831, 250 P.2d 148, 11 A.L.R.2d 277 (Cal. App. 1952)
(nervous tension caused by negotiating labor dispute brought on cerebral hemorrhage) ; Insurance Department of Mississippi v. Dinsmore, 233 Miss. 569, 102
So. 2d 691 (1958) (emotional strain precipitated thrombosis for worker suffering
from hypertension; excellent discussion in both majority and dissenting opinions) ;
Wilder v. Russell Library Co., 107 Conn. 56, 139 Atl. 644 (1927) (job worry
caused librarian to commit suicide) ; Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc.,
10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714 (1961) (heart attack from protracted emotional
strain) ; Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960)
(criticism of worker's inability to perform his duties brought on disabling neurosis. This case goes further than most decisions in two respects: (1) the injury
was psychological rather than physical; (2) the affliction came on gradually and
claim was recognized as an occupational disease, rather than accident). See excellent discussion Workmen's Compensation Awards for Psychoneurotic Reactions,
70 YALE L.J. 1129 (1961).
20. LA. R.S. 23:1021(1) (1950) defines "accident" as follows: "An unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly or violently, with or without
human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury."
21. Id. 23:1020(7) defines "injury" as follows: "'Injury' and 'Personal Injuries' includes only injuries by violence to the physical structure of the body
and such disease or infections as naturally result therefrom. These terms shall
in no case be construed to include any other form of disease or derangement, howsoever caused or contracted."
22. One court of appeal decision goes so far as to observe: "If the words
'objective symptoms of an injury,' employed in the statute were intended to mean
or should be construed to mean what, on their face, they imply, it is obvious that
they have been read out of this definition by a multitude of adjudications by the
appellate courts of this state and by the supreme court, also. Nearly all strain
injuries reveal no 'objective' symptoms at the time of the injury or thereafter."
Rochell v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 188 So. 429, 431 (La. App. 2d Cir.
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pose of the requirement is that of excluding injuries whose
objective symptoms did not appear until after a substantial
lapse of time following the alleged accident (thus suggesting
serious doubt as to whether the accident was a cause in fact of
the harm complained of). But even a delay in the appearance
of symptoms has not precluded awards of compensation in the
past whenever the court became satisfied that the necessary
23
causal relation existed.

The second aspect of the court's rationale was that there was
no violence to the physical structure of the body, and that the
occasion therefore lacked the "accidental" character required
by the statute. The claim of an absence of "violence" has never
served to preclude recovery in the past where the facts were
otherwise appropriate. The "violence" notion has been regarded
as satisfied by such minor phenomena as the ingestion of germs
or lead fumes, by the play of sunlight or heat upon the body,
by changes of atmospheric pressure, by the brushing against
poison ivy or by contact with petroleum products.24 Physical
strains and exertions of all kinds have been regarded as events
of "violence," including the mere act of stooping, which in one
case unexpectedly caused a fracture of a diseased spine. 25 In
this connection, it is noteworthy that there is an obvious inconsistency in the statute between the definitions of "accident"
and "injury," respectively. The "accident" requirement can be
satisfied by proof of an event that happened either "violently"
or "suddenly, ' 26 while "injury is defined as including only "injuries by violence to the physical structure of the body." (Emphasis added.) 27 It is difficult to understand how injuries inflicted suddenly but through non-violent means are to be regarded. In view of the fact that in the past the Louisiana courts
have consistently succeeded in awarding compensation in the
face of earnest contentions that "violence" was lacking, it would
appear to be more consistent with the course of decision to
regard an injury as compensable if it was either inflicted
1939). See cases discussed in MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW & PRACTICE § 216 (1951).
23. See Kraemer v. Jahncke Services, Inc., 83 So. 2d 916 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1955) (heart attack occurring after worker has left the place of employment may
be compensable if causally attributable to strain or exertion on the job).
24. Cases cited and discussed in MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICE § 213 (1951).
25. Talbot v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 99 So. 2d 811 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1958).
26. Note 19 supra.
27. Note 20 supra.
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through violence or occasioned suddenly. Certainly Danziger's
injury must be regarded as "sudden."
The type of problem involved in the Danziger decision is,
in a sense at least, the antithesis of the one presented in the
hysteria or conversion neurosis situations. In these latter cases
there is usually a traumatic injury of some sort which brings
about a disabling emotional disorder without any visible impairment of the body structure, while in the Danziger type
situation the harm is obviously physical, but the source of the
harm is an emotional, rather than a physical, impact. It seems,
therefore, that there would be little or no merit to any contention that the Danziger decision can serve as authority for a
denial of compensation in the neurosis cases.
The unfortunate aspect of the Danziger decision is that the
rule announced by the court seems to require that the door to
recovery be closed arbitrarily in all situations where physical
harm is brought about by purely nervous or psychological impact. There is no room left for play of discretion. The result
could be particularly unhappy in situations where a definite
job event causes shock and fright (as opposed to worry, anxiety,
or general concern) with consequent bodily collapse. One illustration will suffice: Three workers are in the path of an oncoming vehicle. One of them is struck and sustains a fractured
rib. The second worker manages to avoid actual impact, but
his fright causes him to overexert himself in his effort to escape
and he suffers a heart attack. The third worker also narrowly
escapes being struck, but he is frozen by fright and sustains a
cerebral hemorrhage. Under the rationale of the Danziger case
there will be compensation for the fractured rib and also for
the heart attack brought on by the physical exertion in escaping,
but none for the death or disability resulting from the cerebral
hemorrhage that was produced by the sheer terror of the third
worker. Such a conclusion would be opposed to the overwhelming weight of authority in other states whose statutes are not
distinguishable from ours.2 8 Although it is true that shock or
28. Among numerous decisions allowing compensation for heart attacks, paralysis, etc., resulting from shock or fright are: J. N. Geipe, Inc. v. Collett, 172 Md.
165, 190 A. 836, 109 A.L.R. 887 (1937) (excitement trying to avoid accident
caused driver's heart attack); Charon's Case, 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511
(1947) (fright causing hemiplegia as result of lightning producing loud noise and
considerable flash of light) ; Roberts v. Dredge Fund, 71 Idaho 380, 232 P.2d 975
(1951) (shock to nervous system resulting in stoppage of heart while witnessing
replacement of transformer fuse, attended by roar and ball of fire four feet in
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fright, like worry, concern, or frustration, is a nervous or emotional affection, yet in fright cases the causal connection with
the job is obvious and the risk of body damage from fright
produced by some shocking incident on the job is one that clearly arises out of the employment.
DISABILITY
In view of the fact that a common laborer will not be regarded as totally disabled so long as he can compete on a substantially equal basis with able-bodied men in the broad and
diversified labor market, an interesting question arises as to
the effect that should be given to the fact that a common laborer
has been rendered allergic to certain substances, so that he has
lost the capacity to work in an environment where he is exposed
to them. A common laborer who can no longer work in the
vicinity of lime or cement may properly be regarded as totally
disabled, since he has been deprived of access to a substantial
number of construction jobs.2 9 On the other hand, a worker
suffering from lead poisoning, but who can work in any environment where there is no exposure to the possibiltiy of lead
ingestion need not be similarily treated, since the adverse effect
of his handicap will not necessarily impair his ability to compete
on substantially equal terms with reference to most common
labor jobs .3
The Supreme Court has held recently that a miscarriage by
a female worker resulting from a work accident is not to be
regarded necessarily as an impairment of function so as to
authorize an award under R.S. 23:1221(p). 81 Only permanent
impairments are contemplated by the above section. It must be
shown, therefore, that there is some residual effect upon the
diameter) ; Januszewski v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 17 N.J. Super.
164, 85 A.2d 331 (1951) (near collision with truck caused cerebral hemorrhage
for city bus driver) ; Egan's Case, 331 Mass. 11, 116 N.E.2d 844 (1954) (cab
driver suffered cerebral hemorrhage after being called to side by policeman holding three men at bay with gun and told to secure assistance) ; Aetna Insurance
Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (laundry employee suffered
stroke after berating by customer); Pukaluk v. Insurance Company of North
America, 7 A.D. 2d 676, 179 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1958) (cleaning woman in office
building who had been warned of prowlers suffered heart attack when she heard
steps behind her and unexpected entry of person who turned out to be forelady).
29. Lathers v. Schuylkill Products Co., 111 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1959).
30. Robinson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 150 So. 2d 98 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
31. Bergeron v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 243 La. 108, 141 So. 2d 832
(1962).
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child-bearing capacity other than the single experience of the
loss of a child.
CREDIT FOR WAGE PAID To DISABLED EMPLOYEE
AFTER ACCIDENT
There has been considerable confusion during recent years
with respect to credit that may be allowed the employer for
wages paid the disabled employee who after accident was retained on the payroll. For a considerable period the courts of
appeal accepted the proposition that the employer was entitled
to credit of one week's compensation for each weekly wage payment that equalled or exceeded the maximum compensation
allowable. This appeared to be true irrespective of whether the
wage was earned or unearned and irrespective of whether the
work done after accident was the same that the employee per2
formed prior thereto or was different.
In 1952 the Supreme Court in Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford
Glass Co. 83 adopted a position inconsistent with the one announced above. Mottet, a glass cutter, suffered a herniated disc
which caused such pain in the doing of his regular work that
he was obliged to accept a position as watchman with his former
employer. The latter insisted that he be allowed credit for a
week of compensation for each week he had paid claimant wages
as watchman. The Supreme Court, finding that Mottet was totally disabled since he could not perform the work of glass
cutting, concluded that the wages paid as night watchman were
earned in a different kind of work, not requiring any special
skill or training, and could not be considered in the nature of
compensation or serve as a basis for credit for the employer.
The same situation that was before the Supreme Court in
the Mottet case was later presented to the Court of Appeal for
Orleans in Myers v. Jahncke Service. 4 Myers, a shipfitter, who
had lost a hand, was retained for more than a year as a pusher.
During the greater part of this period he received both an earned
wage and compensation payments of $30.00 per week. When
32. Daigle v. Higgins Industries, Inc., 29 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1947) ;
Goodman v. Hillyer, Deutsch, Edwards, Inc., 49 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1950); Schum v. Marion T. Fannaly, Inc., 59 So. 2d 135 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1952) (worker continued same duties with pain) ; Smith v. Houston Fire &
Casualty Ins. Co., 116 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959).
33. 220 La. 653, 57 So. 2d 218 (1952).
34. 76 So. 2d 436 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1954), rehearing denied.
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Myers instituted suit for compensation the employer claimed
credit for the wage payments. This credit was denied by the
court in a lengthy opinion reviewing all previous decisions.
The denial was based on the authority of the Mottet case. Later,
however, the same court made clear that the rule of the Jahncke
Service case applies only where the work done after accident is
of a character different from that which was performed there35
tofore.
The policy of crediting the employer with wage payments
when the worker continued to do work of the same character, 6
but denying credit when the employee was regarded as earning
his wage after accident doing work of an entirely different
nature,3 7 was widely adopted by the courts of appeal following
the Mottet decision. On occasions the courts encountered considerable difficulty in determining whether the new work was
38
or was not of the same nature as before the accident.
However, even if the work done after accident was similar
to that which was previously performed, the employer was denied credit in two court of appeal decisions when the wage had
been reduced because the employee was no longer capable of
performing substantial parts of his same duties.3 9 This conclusion would seem to suggest that the proper distinction to be
35. Beloney v. General Electric Supply Co., 103 So. 2d 491 (La. App. 4th Cir.

1958).
36. Pobl v. American Bridge Division, United States Steel Corp., 109 So. 2d
823 (La. App. Orl. 1959) (iron worker continued to perform similar work at
ground level, but could no longer climb; credit allowed employer for wages)
Beloney v. General Electric Supply Co., 103 So. 2d 491 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1958)
(continued same work with pain; credit for earned wage payments) ; Daniel v.
Transport Ins. Co., 119 So. 2d 107 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960) ; White v. Calcasieu

Paper Co., 96 So. 2d 621 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) ; Walters v. General Accident
& Fire Assurance Corp., Ltd., 119 So. 2d 550 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) (fireman
unable to ride trucks after accident but retained ability to clean up station; held
similar work and credit allowed) ; Ardoin v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 134
So. 2d 323 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Madison v. American Sugar Refining Co.,
134 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) (common laborer who performed different
type of common labor after accident was still doing work of same character, and
employer allowed credit. Reversed by Supreme Court on appeal). Of. Howard
v. Globe Indemnity Co., 147 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
37. Livaccari v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 118 So. 2d 275 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1960) (pipefitter served as foreman following accident; employer
denied credit for wage). Cf. Gaudet v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 143
So. 2d 252 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
38. See particularly Walters v. General Accident & Fire Assurance Corp., Ltd.,
119 So. 2d 550 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) and Howard v. Globe Indemnity Co.,
147 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
39. Woodson v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Co., 121 So. 2d 571 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1960) ; Walters v. General Accident & Fire Assurance Corp., Ltd., 119
So. 2d 550 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
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drawn should be in the direction of earned versus unearned
wage, rather than in terms of differences in the nature of the
work performed before and after accident.
There came a decided turn in the jurisprudence with the Supreme Court's decision in Lindsey v. Continental Cas. Co.40 In

that case, claimant, who was a tractor mechanic, lost substantially all the sight of his right eye through an employment accident. Thereafter he was handicapped in performing any task,
such as measurement, alignment, et cetera, that required binocular vision. However, he was retained by his employer and was,
in fact, assigned additional duties of a supervisory nature with
additional pay. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's
determination that Lindsey was totally disabled, and it denied
the employer credit for the wages paid following the accident.
The court of appeal and the trial court, however, clearly followed
the approach of the Mottet case. The opinion observed that
"there is enough difference in the plaintiff's present duties to
take him out of the 'same employer, same duty, same rate of
pay' rule.

'41

The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of credit to Lindsey's employer. The opinion, however, interpreted the Mottet
decision as laying down a test of earned wage versus unearned
wage, rather than a test of whether the work performed after
accident was the same as that performed theretofore or was
different.
"The basic test supported by the jurisprudence of this
state is whether the wages paid subsequent to the injury are
actually earned. If they are not earned, they are presumed
to be in lieu of compensation.

'42

The position in the Lindsey decision was reaffirmed by the

43
Supreme Court in Madison v. American Sugar Refining Co.

40. 242 La. 694, 138 So. 2d 543 (1962).
41. Lindsey v. Continental Casualty Co., 130 So. 2d 470, 474 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1961).
42. Lindsey v. Continental Casualty Co., 242 La. 694, 701, 138 So. 2d 543,
545 (1962).
43. 243 La. 408, 144 So. 2d 377 (1962). "The fact that the services performed after the injury are similar, or dissimilar, to the services performed before
may be relevant to the question of whether the wages are actually earned, but it
is not decisive of it." Id. at 415, 144 So. 2d at 380. The Lindsey and Madison
decisions were followed in Gaudet v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 143
So. 2d 252 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). Cf. Ardoin v. Southern Farm Bureau, 150
So. 2d 792 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963). But cf. Gisevius v. Jackson Brewing Co.,
152 So. 2d 231 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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In this latter case a common laborer, who suffered a disabling
back injury, was given lighter duties at virtually the same wage.
Credit was denied the employer.
Presumably the rule of the Lindsey and Madison cases applies both where a worker continues to earn the same wage by
performing the same duties with pain and suffering and where
he discharges lighter duties. The employer is entitled to credit
only when it is shown that the handicap under which the employee labors following the accident prevents him from "earning"
the wage he receives. We can only conjecture as to whether or
not the new position will serve to discourage employers from
retaining handicapped workers on their payrolls. It should be
observed, however, that the new position is preferable to the
approach adopted earlier in the Mottet case which appeared to
make the employer's right to credit depend upon a seemingly
irrelevant determination as to whether the work performed
after accident was different in character from that which had
been done theretofore. There is nothing in the Lindsey and
Madison decisions to suggest whether the employer would be
entitled to any credit in cases where the wage after accident
is partially earned and partially unearned. In such cases the
task of determining how much credit should be allowed the employer (for the "unearned" portion) would be virtually impossible from an administrative viewpoint. Presumably the employer will not be entitled to credit for wage payments unless
the wage was paid as a reward for virtually "token" service or
it was paid under an express understanding that it was in lieu
of compensation. The answer here must await clarification in
later decisions.
A further difficulty that would be faced in any attempt to
credit the employer with an "unearned" portion arises from the
fact that since the decision in Carlino v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co.,44 twenty-three years ago, the employer has
never under any circumstances been allowed credit except when
it is shown that the weekly wage payments equalled or exceeded
the maximum allowable weekly compensation. 45 Unless, therefore, the "unearned" portion were fixed at thirty-five dollars
or more, the employer's claim for credit presumably could not
be recognized.
J

44. 196 La. 400, 197 So. 228 (1940).
45. See MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S
402, at 513, 519 (1951).
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